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Abstract 
 
From a sample of commercial banks in Asia Pacific over the 1994-2009 period, this study 
highlights that banks in less competitive markets exhibit lower loan growth and higher 
instability. Such instability is further followed by a decline in deposit growth, suggesting 
that Asian banks are also subject to indirect market discipline mechanisms through bank 
market structure. This study therefore sheds light on the importance of enhancing bank 
competition to overcome bank risk and strengthen financial intermediation. This study 
also advocates greater reliance on market discipline to promote bank stability. 
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 that has resulted in a cyclical 
downturn around the world, bank regulators are concerned with two major conflicting 
objectives. These include boosting financial intermediation that spurs economic growth 
or enhancing bank stability that may reduce banks’ incentive to grant new loans. 
Meanwhile, some studies argue that banks in competitive markets tend to behave 
imprudently by taking too much risk due to a decline in their charter value as a self-
disciplining factor. However, it is also admitted that higher bank competition may 
enhance bank efficiency and reduce intermediation costs which in turn contribute to 
enhance economic growth (e.g. Brissimis et al., 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2004; 
Fernandez et al, 2010). 
In the meantime, to our best knowledge, there is no study that examines the 
implication of bank market structure on bank stability and financial intermediation 
simultaneously. Accordingly, financial stability and economic growth are often 
considered as two separate dimensions. As a matter of fact, bank stability plays an 
important role in economic development because higher bank riskiness can deteriorate 
banks' ability to grant loans, for example when losses are too important and lead to bank 
capital shortfalls. This problem is often referred to as “capital crunch” (e.g. Bernanke and 
Lown, 1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995). Given that bank stability and financial 
intermediation are interrelated, this paper examines how bank competition affects both 
lending behaviour and stability in banking.  
In this paper, we focus on commercial banks in Asia Pacific for several reasons. 
First, the banking sector remains a major source of financing for the real sector in Asia 
Pacific (Adams, 2008). Second, substantial consolidations in the banking industry also 
occurred in Asia Pacific after the 1997 Asian crisis. Specifically, bank consolidations 
have grown significantly reaching 25% per year as of 2003 (Santoso, 2009; Soedarmono 
et al., 2013). In addition,  foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking also has increased 
from US$ 2.5 billion over the 1991-1995 period to US$ 67.5 billion over the 2001-2005 
period and hence, Asian countries have become the second largest recipient of FDI in 
banking after Latin American countries (Domanski, 2005; Moshirian, 2008; Soedarmono 
et al., 2013). These financial landscape changes in Asia Pacific are more likely to affect 
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bank market structure which can in turn alter the behavior of banks in terms of lending 
activities and risk taking.  
For such reasons, focusing on Asia Pacific countries is particularly relevant to 
study the implication of bank competition on both bank stability and financial 
intermediation. To assess these issues, we retrieve a sample of commercial banks from 12 
countries in Asia Pacific that have been affected by the 1997 crisis. These countries 
consist of Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand that have been severely 
affected by the 1997 crisis; as well as India, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Vietnam that were less affected. This study covers the 1994-
2009 period and emphasizes on the use of dynamic panel data techniques.  
Our empirical findings show that higher bank competition strengthens both bank 
loan growth and stability. Furthermore, we also embrace discussions on the role of 
market discipline, since Shaeck and Cihak (2007) document that market discipline is 
likely to play a role in banks in competitive markets. In other words, competing banks 
tend to behave prudently by holding higher capital ratios to gain competitive advantage.  
For a similar reason, in order to gain competitive advantage, banks in competitive 
markets can also be more transparent that those in less competitive markets. Hence, 
higher bank transparency facilitates ex-post market discipline by bank depositors 
whenever bank risk increases via changes in the market structure of banks. Specifically, 
our empirical results show that higher market power in banking increases bank risk, while 
banks in less competitive markets also experience lower deposit growth as a negative 
reaction of bank depositors. Such findings are consistent with the effectiveness of market 
discipline mechanisms in commercial banks in Asia Pacific.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Aside from highlighting our 
research contribution, Section 2 describes prior literature on the bank competition-
stability nexus, as well as the bank competition-growth nexus. Section 3 presents our 
data, variables of interest and econometric models. Section 4 discuses our empirical 
findings and provides some robustness checks, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2.   Related literature and research contribution 
Bank market structure plays an important role in affecting bank stability and 
financial intermediation. However, the impact of bank market structure on bank stability 
and financial intermediation remains an open research area. With regards to the link 
between bank market structure and stability, two major hypotheses have emerged in the 
literature, i.e. the “charter value hypothesis” and the “competition-stability hypothesis”. 
Regarding the impact of bank market structure on economic development, there are also 
two conflicting hypotheses: the “perfect information hypothesis” and the “asymmetric 
information hypothesis”. 
The charter value hypothesis argues that bank charter value is a self-disciplining 
factor that prevents banks from behaving imprudently and thus, higher bank competition 
eroding bank charter value can contribute to higher instability due to higher bank risk 
taking. Keeley (1990) documents that after financial liberalization in the nineties, US 
banks exhibited a decline in their charter value which in turn increased bank risk. 
Similarly, Demsetz et al. (1996) document that US banks with higher charter value tend 
to have better asset quality. Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) also support the charter value 
hypothesis in the case of Latin America. Beck et al. (2006) also examine the effect of 
bank concentration on the probability of banking crises in 69 countries during the 1980-
1997 period. Their findings show that the probability of banking crises in countries with a 
concentrated banking system is lower than in countries with a competitive banking 
system. More recently, Ariss (2010) has focused on the case of developing countries and 
supports the charter value hypothesis.  
In contrast, recent theoretical and empirical studies demonstrate that higher bank 
competition has a stabilizing effect when asymmetric information in loan markets is 
taken into consideration (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd et al, 2006). This is often 
referred to as the competition-stability hypothesis. As bank market power increases, 
banks can be riskier due to higher interest rate on loans. This is because the presence of 
asymmetric information in loan markets exacerbates entrepreneurial moral hazard to 
undertake risky projects to offset higher interest rate charged by banks with higher 
market power. Higher borrowers’ risk can in turn negatively affect bank stability through 
a risk-shifting mechanism (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In the case of European banks, 
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Udhe and Heimeshoff (2009) support the competition-stability hypothesis through the 
link between bank concentration and several risk measures. Liu et al (2012) also find the 
similar results for Southeast Asian banks in which higher bank competition derived from 
the Panzar-Rosse approach is not associated with higher bank risk taking. As well, 
Soedarmono et al (2013) indicate that higher market power in Asian banking is 
associated with higher bank moral hazard, although banks hold a higher capital ratio. 
This finding is however reversed during the 1997 crisis period indicating that market 
power is necessary to prevent an increase in bank default risk in times of crisis. 
While the link between bank competition and financial stability remains 
inconclusive, a related important issue is how bank competition affects financial 
intermediation and economic growth. On the one hand, the perfect information 
hypothesis argues that higher bank competition leads to higher economic growth because 
banks with higher market power tend to charge higher loan prices which may in turn 
preclude financial intermediation activities (Black and Strahan, 2002; Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005; Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2001). On the other hand, the asymmetric 
information hypothesis states that in the presence of asymmetric information, banks with 
higher charter value can erode asymmetric information by investing in relationship 
lending activities. Relationship lending can reduce firms’ financing constraints, spur loan 
availability and enhance economic growth (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berlin and 
Mester, 1998). 
Building on these previous studies, a potential trade-off between bank stability 
and financial intermediation can occur along with changes in bank market structure. 
Higher bank competition is indeed expected to boost loan growth because banks in more 
competitive markets tend to misprice their loan interest rates in expanding intermediation 
activities (Ogura, 2006). However, Foos et al (2010) provide evidence in which higher 
loan growth can lead to higher bank risk. In this paper we attempt to contribute to the 
ongoing debate regarding the impact of bank market structure on both bank stability and 
financial intermediation proxied by bank loan growth. Our paper extends the literature in 
several directions. First, a large number of studies rely on bank concentration or 
Herfindahl index measures to assess the degree of bank competition, while our present 
study employs the non-structural measure of bank competition derived from the new 
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industrial organization approach following Soedarmono et al. (2011; 2013). Second, prior 
studies focus on the immediate impact of bank market structure, while this study also 
explores whether today’s bank risk, and loan growth is determined by last year’s bank 
market structure. Third, we extend the competition-stability-growth nexus by examining 
whether bank market structure affects depositors’ reaction to bank risk and hence, we 
embrace issues on the role of market discipline exerted by bank depositors.  
As a matter of fact, the association between bank competition and market 
discipline cannot be separated. Schaeck and Cihak (2007) emphasize that banks in 
competitive markets tend to behave prudently due to the presence of “peer market 
discipline” that induces competing banks to hold more capital to gain competitive 
advantages. Similarly, banks in competitive markets can be more motivated than those in 
concentrated market to strengthen information transparency for gaining further 
competitive advantages. Eventually, competitive markets can strengthen bank depositors’ 
ability to monitor bank behaviour.  
In the meantime, prior studies demonstrate that bank depositors can strongly react 
to bank risk. In the presence of market discipline, bank depositors require higher interest 
rates on their deposits or withdraw their deposits when banks take on more risk 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Martinez-Peria and Schumkler, 2001). In this 
paper, our investigation regarding market discipline differs from previous studies, since 
we assess bank depositors’ reaction to bank risk indirectly via bank market structure. As 
the market structure of banks clearly affects bank risk, we expect that bank depositors’ 
reaction to bank risk is also dependent on bank market structure.  
On the whole, this paper provides several policy implications in order to enhance 
both financial intermediation and bank stability. Specifically, what type of bank market 
structure will strengthen both financial intermediation and bank stability? Could bank 
regulators rely on the role played by depositors to discipline banks’ behavior instead of 
preserving a banking market structure that precludes financial intermediation? We 
believe that these questions are of particular interest in both academic and policy circles 
to ensure better bank resilience and macroeconomic performance. 
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3. Data, variables and methodology 
3.1. Data  
An unbalanced panel of annual bank-level data are retrieved from BankScope 
Fitch IBCA. Our dataset initially consists of 686 commercial banks from 12 countries in 
Asia Pacific from 1994 to 2009. These countries include China (103), Hong Kong (68), 
India (84), Indonesia (108), Malaysia (63), Sri Lanka (14), South Korea (50), Taiwan 
(50), Thailand (40), Pakistan (34), Philippines (39), and Vietnam (33)2. Moreover, 
country-specific data are also taken from various sources. These include the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) established by the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank Financial Structure Dataset established by Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), as well 
as the economic freedom index at the country level coming from Heritage Foundation. 
All country-specific data other than the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross 
domestic product (STOCK) and the economic freedom index (ECOFREE) come from the 
IFS. Meanwhile, STOCK and ECOFREE come from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) 
and Heritage Foundation, respectively. 
 
3.2. Variables  
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
Bank loan growth is used to assess financial intermediation. Let i and t represent 
bank index and time index, respectively. We define bank loan growth as follows:    1,,1,,, 5.0   tititititi TATALLDLOAN  
L is banks’ total loans in million US dollar, while TA is banks’ total assets in million US 
dollar. Moreover, for robustness considerations, we also consider another measure of 
bank loan growth. Specifically, we use the annual growth rate of total loans (LOANG).  
In the meantime, we use credit risk and income volatility measures to assess bank 
stability. Credit risk is defined as the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP), 
while income volatility is the standard deviation of the return on assets computed from a 
three-period rolling window (SDROA). In other words, the standard deviation of return on 
assets at time t is calculated based on the return on assets from time t to 2t .  
                                                 
2
 The number of banks in each country is shown in parentheses. 
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Finally, in order to measure how bank depositors react to bank risk, we use the 
following measure where D is bank total deposits in million US dollar.     1,,1,,, 5.0   tititititi TATADDDDEPO  
Alternatively, we consider the annual growth rate of total deposits (DEPOG) as in 
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001).  
 
3.2.2. Bank market structure 
In order to assess bank market structure, we construct the Lerner index derived 
from the industrial organization approach. Indeed, there are various methods to assess the 
degree of competition in banking markets. As a straightforward method, previous papers 
use the Herfindahl index (e.g. Berger et al, 2009; Schaeck and Cihak, 2009; Behr et al, 
2010), or bank concentration ratios as in Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009). However, these 
two indicators are rather crude measures which do not appropriately infer the degree of 
competition among banks, since they do not take into account different characteristics of 
banks, such as asset size, business type, ownership type, and so on (Beck, 2008).  
To better infer the degree of bank competition, Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) is the 
first to modify the non-structural measure of competition derived from Bresnahan (1982) 
and applied to Japanese banks. The merit of this measure is that it does neither require 
any assumption on the equilibrium of the banking market as in Panzar and Rosse (1987), 
nor the market structure of each bank which can be different across banks, even for 
similar types of banks. Using a panel data methodology, Uchida and Tsutsui’s (2005) 
method can again capture the degree of bank competition over time.  
The aggregate index of bank market power derived by Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) 
is already used in previous studies related to Asian banks. These include Soedarmono et 
al. (2011) and Soedarmono et al. (2013). Specifically, the degree of bank competition is 
computed using the system of equations as follows: 
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Each variable with bars represents a deviation from its cross-sectional mean in each time 
period. Bank competition for each year is represented by  1,0t  depicting the 
conjectural variations of elasticity of total banking industry outputs with respect to the 
output of bank i. In the case of perfect competition, 0t  ; under pure monopoly, 
1t  ; and finally, 0t implies pricing below marginal cost.  
 Moreover, itC  is defined by total expenses, itq  by total earning assets, itd  by total 
deposits and short-term funding, itw  by the ratio of operating expenses to total assets, itR  
by total revenue, itr  by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits, itp  by the ratio of 
total revenue to total earning assets. tGDPG , tSTOCK , tIR  and itTA  are factors that 
affect the demand for loans, defined as the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP), 
the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, the short-term interest rate, and bank total 
assets, respectively.  
 To estimate System (1), country-level estimations are conducted and we use the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method, while t  is estimated by annual time 
dummy variables and   by bi-annual time dummy variables (every two years), since   
values are linearly dependent on the time-specific variables (GDPG, STOCK and IR). In 
the subsequent analyses, t  denotes the Lerner index of the banking industry in each 
country over time (LERNER). 
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3.2.3. Control variables 
 Several bank-specific control variables are incorporated in this study. First, bank 
size (SIZE) measured by the logarithm of banks’ total assets is considered as one of the 
control variables because larger bank size tends to exacerbate bank risk taking (Mishkin, 
2006) and to some extents, larger banks are subject to greater market discipline 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2011). Bank size is also a determinant of bank loan 
growth as in Foos et al (2010).  
Second, we incorporate the ratio of total deposits to total assets (DEPO) as a 
control variable which directly affects deposit growth (DDEPO or DEPOG). Bank 
deposits are also the source of withdrawal risk and thus, DEPO is expected to have a 
significant relationship with bank risk. Bank deposits can also have an impact on loan 
growth because of the nature of intermediation activities in banking (deposits funded 
loans).  
Third, we consider the banks’ total capital adequacy ratio (CAR), since bank 
capital ratios admittedly affect lending behaviour which may lead to “capital crunch” 
problems. The capital adequacy ratio may also affect risk and in turn affect market 
discipline through its influence on bank risk.  
Another source of loan growth and bank risk is the extent to which banks engage 
in non-interest income activities. In particular, banks engaging in fee and commission-
based income can underprice loans and hence, granting loans at a lower cost in order to 
sell other fee-based products to their customers. This in turn fosters loan growth, but 
underestimated credit risk may erode bank stability. To account for non-interest income 
activities, we incorporate the ratio of non-interest income to total revenue (NNI) as a 
control variable. 
 Aside from bank-specific factors, we also consider country-specific factors as 
control variables. We consider the inflation rate (INF), where higher inflation rate can 
increase the bank lending rate which deepens adverse selection problems and might 
increase bank instability. Meanwhile, bank loan growth and risk are also strongly 
correlated with economic growth. As economic growth increases, banks tend to foster 
loan activities and underestimate risk which can result in higher bank fragility. However, 
economic growth can also neutralize bank moral hazard and risk, particularly when 
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economic growth contributes to real sector profitability and bank stability (Soedarmono 
et al, 2011). To account for economic growth, we use the growth rate of real per capita 
gross domestic product (GDPG).  
In the next turn, we also consider the degree of economic freedoms (ECOFREE) 
and the foreign exchange reserves growth rate (FOREXG) to control for institutional 
development and macroeconomic stability. Higher institutional development indeed 
affects bank risk and banks’ incentives to grant loans (Houston et al, 2011; Fernandez et 
al, 2010), while Mohanty and Turner (2006) argue that foreign exchange reserves may 
affect bank risk exposure because banks are sensitive to foreign exchange fluctuations.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
 To accurately conduct our empirical investigation, we eliminate values which are 
higher than 1 and smaller than 0 for DEPO, CAR and NNI. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of all the “clean” variables used in this study. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
In terms of econometric methodology, we use a dynamic panel data model. In 
reality, loan growth, risk and deposit growth in banking vary over time, while their 
current values at time t are more likely to be dependent on their value at time 1t . Based 
on the nature of these dependent variables, the use of dynamic panel data methodology is 
relevant. Dynamic panel data models that account for the one year-lagged value of 
dependent variable as control variable, and that are able to endogenize several 
explanatory variables, are again appropriate to cope with reverse causality problems 
which may occur between dependent and explanatory variables. Dynamic panel data 
models are also appropriate to analyze both the short-run and long-run effects of 
explanatory variables on dependent variables.  
In this study, our explanatory variable of interest is the degree of bank 
competition (LERNER). Given the possibility that banks do not immediately respond to 
changes in market structure, it is also worth examining whether bank market structure 
after a one year time lag or LERNER(-1) has an impact on dependent variables. 
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Furthermore, we use the two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimations 
following Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This method is also 
referred to as the system GMM.  
The System GMM is essentially an extension of the standard GMM developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). Arellano and Bond (1991) only consider the first difference of 
each variable in the regressions, while the lagged levels of explanatory variables are used 
as instruments. The use of the lagged levels as instruments may be inappropriate, 
particularly when variables are close to a random walk. To overcome this shortcoming, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) develop the system GMM to 
improve the standard GMM by introducing the levels equation to produce a system of 
two equations consisting of the levels equation itself and the first-differenced equation. 
Hence, lagged differences of the explanatory and dependent variables can be valid 
instruments for the levels equation. To this end, Baltagi (2005) proves that the System 
GMM produces more efficient and precise estimates than the standard GMM.  
Likewise, we introduce several endogenous variables in our dynamic panel data 
models. In all dynamic panel data models we run, we consider LERNER and LERNER(-1) 
as endogenous variables because both variables are estimated using the SUR method 
based on a system of three equations as shown in System (1). Hence, LERNER and 
LERNER(1) can contain measurement error and thus, need to be instrumented. We also 
consider CAR as an endogenous variable, because bank capital management is dependent 
on banks’ managerial discretion, as well as bank-specific and country-specific 
characteristics including bank size, ownership type, bank market structure, business 
cycle, and so on. Finally, we also endogenize GDPG, since the real per capita income 
growth is admittedly dependent on various factors, including bank market structure 
(Fernandez et al, 2010). Endogenizing GDPG can thus overcome simultaneity bias in 
which GDPG can be influenced by other explanatory variables, including LERNER. 
Given that our models contains an autoregressive variable, we then use the 
orthogonal deviations transformation of instrumental variables in order to take cross-
section fixed effects into account. Considering bank-level fixed effects is an important 
dimension because our bank sample is heterogeneous and comes from different countries 
with different macroeconomic, institution and regulatory environments. We further 
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include time dummies in our models to account for time fixed-effects. Yet, we also take 
into account Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction to ensure that our estimates are 
robust. Finally, we verify the validity of our dynamic panel data models using AR (2) test 
and Hansen-J test. The GMM model is valid when AR (2) and Hansen-J test are both not 
significant, which respectively show that there is no second order serial correlation 
among errors of first-differenced equation, and that our identifying restrictions are valid. 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Bank market structure and loan growth 
 When banks operate in a more competitive market, they tend to boost loans by 
setting lower loan prices to attract new borrowers (Ogura, 2006). Prior literature also 
suggests that higher degree of bank competition boosts small businesses development, as 
borrowing costs decline (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2001). 
Building on such findings, we focus our investigation on the impact of bank market 
structure on loan growth as a proxy of financial intermediation. 
  As shown in Table 2, we highlight that banks in less competitive markets tend to 
reduce loan growth. In other words, our findings are consistent with the nexus between 
LERNER and bank loan growth (DLOAN or LOANG). We further notice that DLOAN and 
LOANG equations are both valid, as both AR (2) test and Hansen-J test are not 
significant.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 Several insights can be drawn from these findings. Banks in less competitive 
markets tend to have higher market power which enables them to increase their lending 
rates. However, Banks in less competitive markets might also be more prudent than those 
in competitive markets, and therefore higher credit risk might be priced appropriately 
which unfortunately leads to lower loan growth.  
Moreover, in the presence of asymmetric information in loan markets, 
entrepreneurs who obtain loans can respond to higher loan pricing by running riskier 
projects to offset higher lending rates. Entrepreneurs’ moral hazard can therefore 
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exacerbate bank riskiness through risk-shifting mechanisms (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). 
On the contrary, in the absence of asymmetric information, bank riskiness will decline 
with higher LERNER, as long as banks in less competitive markets do not underestimate 
risk and set up lending rates appropriately, albeit reducing loan growth afterward. In the 
following section, we investigate the impact of LERNER on bank riskiness in order to 
verify whether the relation between LERNER and bank loan growth (DLOAN or LOANG) 
is presumably characterized by the presence of asymmetric information.  
 
4.2. Bank market structure and risk 
 In Table 2, we document our empirical results on the nexus between LERNER and 
bank risk measured by credit risk (LLP) and income volatility (SDROA). We find that 
higher LERNER is associated with higher LLP and SDROA, suggesting that banks in less 
competitive markets tend to have higher credit risk and income volatility. The positive 
link between LERNER and bank riskiness (LLP and SDROA) is also unaltered when we 
consider the impact of LERNER at time t-1 on bank riskiness at time t, although such a 
positive link is tempered. Hence, higher LERNER clearly results in higher bank riskiness. 
Moreover, both LLP and SDROA equations in Table 2 are valid because AR (2) test and 
Hansen-J test are not significant. This result remains consistent with Soedarmono et al 
(2011 & 2013), although in their study they apply a static panel data model using both 
fixed effect and two-stage least squares methods.  
Combining the results  regarding the competition-growth nexus, as well as the 
competition-stability nexus, we show that although banks in less competitive markets 
reduce loan growth, such a reduction is not sufficient to improve their stability. Hence, as 
mentioned earlier, asymmetric information problems are more likely to exist exacerbating 
entrepreneurs’ moral hazard that in turn might increase the riskiness of banks in less 
competitive markets.  
 
4.3. Bank market structure and deposit growth 
 Since higher market power in banking leads to lower loan growth but higher 
instability in Asian banks, it is worth examining whether such instability can be mitigated 
by market discipline. In this section, we are particularly interested in the role played by 
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bank depositors in facing higher bank riskiness. Market discipline is indeed of particular 
interest for bank regulators and it has been further emphasized in the new Basel accords. 
From Table 2, we observe that the link between LERNER and deposit growth 
(DDEPO and DEPOG) is negative and significant. This indicates that banks in less 
competitive markets experience lower deposit growth. Given that banks in less 
competitive markets (higher LERNER) tend to exhibit higher credit risk and income 
volatility as discussed in the previous section, our results show that bank depositors are 
indeed sensitive to bank risk along with an increase in market power in banking. Overall, 
our GMM models for DDEPO and DEPOG equations are valid because AR (2) test and 
Hansen-J test are both insignificant. 
 
4.5. Robustness checks 
4.5.1. Alternative model specifications 
For robustness3, we now provide several sensitivity analyses. First, we do not 
consider GDPG and CAR as endogenous variables in the estimations using a dynamic 
panel data methodology. Using this specification, the impact of LERNER on loan growth, 
risk and deposit growth in banking remains unaltered. This new specification also 
remains valid because both AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are not significant. Second, we 
eliminate time dummies from our dynamic panel data models and again, this 
consideration does not change our findings.  
 
4.5.2. Static panel data methodology 
 To further ensure the robustness of the impact of market power in banking on 
bank loan growth, risk and deposit growth, we re-estimate the link using a static panel 
model by taking into account individual and time-fixed effects. Table 3 presents our 
empirical results using the panel fixed effects regressions. Our previous findings remain 
consistent and robust. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
                                                 
3
 The results are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request to the authors 
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4.6. Bank market structure and loan pricing: an additional analysis 
 We also perform an additional analysis to highlight whether a decline in bank 
loan growth and an increase in risk along with higher market power in banking are indeed 
due to the fact that banks in less competitive markets set higher loan pricing. Hence, we 
now examine how market power in banking affects bank loan pricing.  
 In order to assess bank loan pricing, we use the ratio of net interest income to total 
earning assets or net interest margin (NIM). Alternatively, we also use the ratio of net 
interest income to total assets (NIMTA). Initially, NIM and NIMTA are cleaned to ensure 
that they neither contain outliers nor exhibit a skewed distribution. Specifically, we 
impose a restriction to NIM and NIMTA by eliminating both their 2.5% lowest values and 
2.5% highest values.  Table 4 presents the empirical results using the two-step GMM 
dynamic panel data model following Blundell and Bond (1998).  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
From Table 4, we document that higher LERNER is significantly associated with higher 
NIM, particularly when we exclude LERNER(-1) from the regression, as shown in Model 
2. In fact, incorporating LERNER(-1) in the regression does not alter the relationship sign 
between LERNER and NIM, albeit not statistically significant, as shown in Model 1 
(Table 4).  
Our model that specifically uses NIM as the dependent variable is valid because 
AR(2) tests are not rejected. Meanwhile, Hansen-J tests are not significant and hence, the 
validity of our instrumental variables remains ensured at least at the 5% level. However, 
when we use NIMTA as an alternative measure of net interest margin, the results are less 
robust than those when NIM is used as a proxy of net interest margin. Although we still 
find a positive relationship between LERNER and NIMTA. 
These findings indicate that banks in less competitive markets tend to charge 
higher interest rates on loans which increases net interest margin. By extension, as 
discussed from Section 4.1 to 4.2, such a behavior leads to a decline in loan growth and 
an increase in bank risk because of the presence of entrepreneurial moral hazard in loan 
markets.  
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5. Conclusion  
This paper aims to highlight the implication of bank market structure on financial 
intermediation and bank riskiness. Our findings strongly emphasize that market power in 
banking is negatively related to bank loan growth as a proxy of financial intermediation, 
and is positively associated with bank instability measured by credit risk and income 
volatility. Banks in less competitive markets are indeed more unstable and less beneficial 
than those in competitive markets in strengthening financial intermediation. In addition to 
that, this study further highlights the role of market discipline exerted by bank depositors. 
As market power in banking results in higher instability, bank depositors in less 
competitive markets tend to deposit lower amounts. Nevertheless, there are also other 
factors affecting bank market discipline in the case of Asian banks.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Lerner       
Q Total earning assets (million USD) 12359.5 58044.65 0.126 1.44E+06 
C Total expenses (million USD) 90240.113 529468.451 0.013 13897949 
D Total deposits and short term funding (million USD) 10535.445 54044.344 0.002 1431017.91 
R Total revenue (million USD) 75003.77 483640.2 -2754.779 13897949 
W Ratio of total operating expenses to total assets  0.023908 0.024928 1.65E-04 0.878493 
R Ratio of interest expenses to total deposits 0.10337 0.21097 1.52E-02 8.5098 
P Ratio of total revenue to total earning assets 13.52625 32.28294 -1.277457 675.2431 
IR Annual short-term interest rate 0.07779 0.07444 0.0007 0.6279 
STOCK Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 0.89522 1.113848 0.00445 7.425013 
Explanatory var.      
LERNER  Lerner index (Lerner index)  0.05340 0.52399 -0.98699 1.92911 
SIZE Logarithm of bank total assets 7.48835 2.01198 -1.09961 14.36128 
DEPO Ratio of total deposits to total assets 0.72574 0.19381 0.00003 0.99655 
CAR Total capital adequacy ratio 0.16454 0.11255 0.00500 0.91500 
NNI Ratio of non-net interest revenue to total revenue 0.21961 0.20513 0.00007 0.99848 
INF Inflation rate 0.06067 0.05901 -0.03947 0.58020 
GDPG Real per capita GDP growth rate 0.05514 0.03393 -0.13127 0.14195 
ECOFREE Economic freedom index 0.61457 0.12189 0.38600 0.90500 
FOREXG Foreign exchange reserves growth rate 0.20020 0.29048 -0.68859 1.63632 
Dependent var.      
DLOAN Loan growth rate 0.0512085 0.4326531 -1.968385 1.496386 
LOANG Actual loan growth rate 0.1759484 0.3409541 -0.9954025 2.461539 
LLP Ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 0.0193369 0.051427 0.0000136 0.9486932 
SDROA Standard deviation of ROA from time t to t – 2  0.011291 0.0371811 5.55E-06 0.8463556 
DDEPO Deposit growth rate 0.09762 0.1944373 -1.138423 1.569936 
NIM Ratio of net interest income to total earning assets -0.0345608 0.1037 -2.085 1.0714 
NIMTA Ratio of net interest income to total assets -0.0276 0.0738 -2.0508 1.0029 
DEPOG Actual deposit growth rate 0.184506 0.3865803 -0.9979501 3.089286 
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Table 2. Bank market structure, loan growth, risk and market discipline. All variable definitions follow Table 1. Models are estimated using the 
two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator following Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample 
corrections, orthogonal deviations transformation of instruments and period dummies. Models are valid when AR(2) tests and Hansen-J tests are 
not rejected are not significant. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Loan Growth Risk Deposit Growth 
  DLOAN LOANG LLP SDROA DDEPO DEPOG 
Explanatory Variables       
       
DEP.VAR(-1) -0.0672** 0.1871*** 0.1365** 0.6519*** 0.0438 0.0900*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
LERNER -0.0402* -0.0895** 0.0241*** 0.0016* -0.0895*** -0.1244*** 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.008) (0.001) (0.025) (0.047) 
LERNER(-1) 0.0240 0.0480 -0.0129** 0.0006 0.0542** 0.0941** 
 (0.021) (0.035) (0.007) (0.001) (0.024) (0.045) 
SIZE -0.0036 0.0025 -0.0012** -0.0006*** -0.0000 -0.0059 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) 
DEPO -0.0077 0.0378 0.0040 -0.0001 0.2412*** 0.1380** 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.006) (0.001) (0.026) (0.055) 
CAR -0.1107 -0.0067 0.0370 -0.0092** 0.0532 -0.0134 
 (0.074) (0.120) (0.030) (0.003) (0.074) (0.153) 
NNI -0.0038 0.0263 0.0133** 0.0048*** 0.0644** 0.1015 
 (0.035) (0.055) (0.007) (0.001) (0.032) (0.070) 
INF 0.1859*** 0.4070*** -0.0205** -0.0033* 0.2231*** 0.4385*** 
 (0.054) (0.102) (0.010) (0.002) (0.063) (0.129) 
GDPG 0.5003*** 0.8482*** -0.0907*** -0.0064 0.6102*** 0.8357*** 
 (0.123) (0.203) (0.023) (0.005) (0.124) (0.236) 
ECOFREE -0.1688*** -0.2812*** -0.0132** 0.0026** -0.1135*** -0.1638** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
FOREXG 0.0905*** 0.1639*** 0.0080*** -0.0002 0.1734*** 0.2625*** 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.003) (0.001) (0.017) (0.034) 
              
Observations 3,268 3,000 2,609 3,023 3,037 3,006 
Z-score for AR(1) test. -4.36*** -6.72*** -2.78*** -5.42*** -7.24*** -5.15*** 
Z-score for AR(2) test -1.72 0.04 0.21 -0.54 -0.87 -0.43 
p-value for Hansen-J test  0.516 0.871 0.963 0.795 0.842 0.867 
Endogenous variables DLOAN(-1) LOANG(-1) LLP(-1) SDROA(-1) DDEPO(-1) DEPOG(-1) 
 LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER LERNER 
 LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) LERNER(-1) 
 CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
  GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG GDPG 
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Table 3. Bank market structure, loan growth, risk and market discipline. All variable definitions follow Table 1. Models are estimated using the 
fixed-effect panel regressions, accounting for both individual and time-fixed effects. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. Constants are included, but not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 Loan Growth Risk Deposit Growth 
  DLOAN LOANG LLP SDROA DDEPO DEPOG 
Explanatory Variables       
LERNER -0.1225*** -0.1202*** 0.0049* -0.0036 -0.0776*** -0.1184*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.029) 
SIZE 0.0010 0.0259** -0.0053*** -0.0013*** 0.0387*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.012) 
DEPO -0.0467 -0.0540 0.0117* 0.0065*** 0.4567*** 0.5511*** 
 (0.051) (0.059) (0.006) (0.002) (0.033) (0.067) 
CAR -0.1229* -0.2560*** 0.0315*** -0.0016 0.0970** 0.1020 
 (0.069) (0.081) (0.009) (0.002) (0.045) (0.090) 
NNI 0.0980*** 0.0340 -0.0085** -0.0014 0.1104*** 0.1762*** 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.004) (0.001) (0.023) (0.046) 
INF 0.2931*** 0.3381*** -0.0193* -0.0046 0.2357*** 0.3837*** 
 (0.104) (0.116) (0.011) (0.003) (0.067) (0.131) 
GDPG 0.3235* 0.6730*** -0.0928*** -0.0041 0.5069*** 0.8964*** 
 (0.177) (0.199) (0.020) (0.006) (0.114) (0.223) 
ECOFREE 0.0033* -0.0044** 0.0009*** 0.0001** -0.0006 -0.0008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
FOREXG 0.0869*** 0.1867*** 0.0098*** -0.0006 0.1878*** 0.3038*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.027) 
              
Observations 3,532 3,342 3,087 3,353 3,371 3,351 
R-square 0.019 0.039 0.048 0.066 0.141 0.081 
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Table 4. Bank market structure and net interest margin. All variable definitions follow Table 1. Models are estimated using the two-step 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator following Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample corrections, 
orthogonal deviations transformation of instruments and period dummies. Models are valid when AR(2) tests and Hansen-J tests are not rejected 
are not significant. (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Model 1                        Model 2 
  NIM NIMTA NIM NIMTA 
Explanatory Variables     
DEP.VAR (-1) 0.111*** 0.178*** 0.112*** 0.177*** 
 
(0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0402) (0.0388) 
LERNER 0.00374 1.80e-05 0.00319** 0.00248** 
 
(0.00473) (0.00416) (0.00133) (0.00115) 
LERNER(-1) -0.00206 0.00111   
 
(0.00463) (0.00390)   
SIZE 0.000587 0.000479 0.000397 0.000327 
 
(0.000442) (0.000340) (0.000428) (0.000336) 
DEPO 0.00691* 0.00479* 0.00536 0.00361 
 
(0.00390) (0.00281) (0.00382) (0.00277) 
CAR 0.0552*** 0.0445*** 0.0479*** 0.0386*** 
 
(0.0112) (0.00974) (0.0109) (0.00931) 
NNI -0.0313*** -0.0277*** -0.0330*** -0.0293*** 
 
(0.00379) (0.00352) (0.00371) (0.00335) 
INF 0.00551 0.0101 0.000804 0.00651 
 
(0.00821) (0.00668) (0.00830) (0.00660) 
GDPG 0.0437** 0.0345** 0.0440** 0.0355** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0142) (0.0185) (0.0145) 
ECOFREE -0.0196*** -0.0149*** -0.0192*** -0.0146*** 
 
(0.00516) (0.00371) (0.00474) (0.0036) 
FOREXG -0.00210 -0.00123 -0.00109 -0.000273 
 
(0.00211) (0.00158) (0.00187) (0.00145) 
Observations 3285 3284 3378 3337 
Z-score for AR(1) test -3.40*** -3.59*** -3.38*** -3.61*** 
Z-score for AR(2) test -1.72 -2.09** -1.78 -2.11** 
p-value for Hansen J-test  0.621 0.657 0.519 0.605 
Endogenous variables NIM(-1) NIMTA(-1) NIM(-1) NIMTA(-1) 
 LERNER & LERNER(-1) LERNER & LERNER(-1) LERNER & LERNER(-1) LERNER & LERNER(-1) 
 CAR & GDPG CAR & GDPG CAR & GDPG CAR & GDPG 
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